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Essays
Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate
Georgia Warnke*
For Hans-Georg Gadamer, the task of any historical hermeneutics
is "to consider the tension that exists between the identity of the
common object and the changing situation in which it must be
understood."1 With regard to legal hermeneutics this task issues from
the circumstance that "[a] law does not exist in order to be
understood historically, but to be concretized in its legal validity by
being interpreted .... [T]he text ... if it is to be understood proper-
ly-i.e., according to the claim it makes-must be understood at every
moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way."2
Gadamer concludes that this combination of identity and change is
the sense to be given to Aristotle's conception of natural law. On the
one hand, the idea of natural law indicates that "despite all the
* Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside. Previous works include
GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION, AND REASON (1987) and JUSTICE AND
INTERPRETATION (1992). This Essay and Professor Greenawalt's Essay constituted the program
for the Section on Law and Interpretation of the January 1997 Association of American Law
Schools meeting. Professor Warnke's reply was written especially for this publication.
1. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 309 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989) (1960).
2. Id.
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variety of moral ideas in the most different times and
peoples ... there is still something like the nature of the thing."3 On
the other hand, "the nature of the thing" does not determine an un-
varying content that is the same as a fire that "burns everywhere in
the same way, whether in Greece or in Persia."4 In this Essay, I want
to consider this claim not by considering natural law directly but by
looking at certain of our current debates over the meaning of
universal principles we think are embedded in the U.S. Constitution.
I shall begin by underlining what I take to be relevant aspects of
Gadamer's hermeneutics and then turn to disputes, such as those over
abortion and affirmative action, that seem to divide Americans'
understanding of constitutional principles in increasingly bitter ways.
MEANING AND HISTORY
In Gadamer's view, the understanding, interpretation, and ap-
plication of meaning all define the same process. Understanding is
always understanding as. It is interpretive insofar as it appropriates
meaning through a particular set of categories that indicate a
particular "horizon" of expectations and presumptions. Heidegger
famously refers to this horizon as the "forestructure" of understan-
ding,5 while Gadamer grounds it in "prejudice."6 But the point of
both descriptions is that we always understand or appropriate
meanings from a particular point of view with particular concerns,
frameworks, and assumptions. Our understanding of meaning is
neither unconditioned nor objective but directed by an anticipation of
meaning that, insofar as it conceives of that which is to be understood
from a particular horizon, is also interpretive and, indeed, applicative.
It understands in terms of anticipations or prejudices rooted in
particular situations and circumstances and reflects the meaning a text
or text-analogue such as an action, social practice, or norm has for the
interpreter, given his or her situation.
Emma Thompson's cinematic interpretation of Jane Austen's Sense
and Sensibility offers a case in point.7 However forcefully one argues
that the film is faithful to the text, it is clear that the film interprets
the text and does so from a particularly contemporary point of view.
What is striking from this point of view is the propriety with which
Elinor Dashwood (the woman whom Thompson portrays) acts. As
3. Id. at 320.
4. Id. (paraphrasing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics, bk. 5, § 7, 11. 26-27).
5. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 192-95 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962).
6. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 277.
7. SENSE AND SENSIBILITY (Columbia Pictures 1995).
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Thompson understands it, her character's propriety is not simply a
superficial conformity to established conventions, but rather an
attempt to act in a way that is most conscious of one's ethical duties
towards others. In particular, Elinor's sense of propriety requires her
to be sensitive to the feelings of others by not overwhelming them
with her own feelings if those feelings would sadden or worry them.
Hence, she tells no one when she discovers that Edward Ferrars,
whom she loves, is already betrothed to Lucy Steele. Because of his
own ethical propriety, Elinor knows that Edward is committed to
marrying Lucy even though he now loves Elinor. Moreover, it is in
part because of his ethical propriety that Elinor loves him. Hence, the
situation is not one that can be helped and, for this reason, Elinor
declines to burden her family with her despair.
The film version of the novel emphasizes the contrast between
Elinor's behavior and the self-absorbed exuberance of her sister,
Marianne, who attempts to witness, feel, and express her life in all its
emotional range as well as to have her family and friends witness,
feel, and express it with her. In its presentation of the contrast, the
film highlights the effort that an ethical propriety requires, inserting
a scene in which Elinor begs her ill sister not to die since without her
Elinor does not think she will be able to bear her life. The film also
treats with sympathy and indulgence a scene depicting Elinor's final
deviation from propriety in which she bursts into uncontrollable and
public tears upon discovering that Edward has not married Lucy after
all and, in addition, has been released from the engagement through
no act of betrayal of his own.
Yet the film's focus on Elinor's heroic struggle to maintain her own
self-restraint is not one that Austen herself would necessarily share.
Indeed in the novel, Elinor is quite able to control herself until she
has left the room; she weeps only in private. But the movie's
interpretive attention both to Elinor's propriety in trying to hide her
feelings from those who can do nothing to ease them and the strength
of those feelings themselves does reveal for a contemporary audience
a facet of Austen's work that is important for us: namely, the idea
that an ethically grounded propriety is not the same as conventionality
and that our own assumptions as to the value of emotional expression
have their limits. If other epochs do not share our sense of the
meaning of Austen's novel, the divergence does not mean that our
understanding is any less legitimate for us.
What is meant by this sort of legitimacy? Thompson's cinematic
version of Sense and Sensibility both admires Elinor's self-restraint
and smiles at the lengths to which she assumes she ought to take it.
Why not, thinks a more contemporary consciousness, express your
emotions, at least those that threaten to debilitate you, even if they
19971
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embarrass others or burden them with matters they cannot resolve?
What Austen considers ethical propriety in general we recognize as
a peculiarly English version of it. Therefore, although Thompson
shows us we can learn from Austen's depiction of English propriety
to question some of our own emotional expressiveness and self-
absorption, the way we understand this propriety necessarily differs
from the way in which Austen understood it.
Here the equal legitimacy of our understanding with Austen's own
of a text that is meant to be our "common object," to use Gadamer's
terminology, depends upon history. Austen had no basis for
contextualizing English self-restraint or at least could not look at it as
we might, as both an instructive and a somewhat sweet and old-
fashioned ethnic trait. We cannot understand Austen the way she
understood herself because history has proceeded, because cir-
cumstances elicit a coarseness Elinor could not have had, because the
twentieth century has publicly witnessed events to which a self-
restrained response would be horrible, and because we take ourselves
more seriously as individuals rather than as parts of family and
community networks to which we have certain obligations. To tie a
legitimate understanding of Sense and Sensibility to its original
audience's or Austen's own understanding would thus be a fruitless
exercise in trying to get out of our own historical situation.8
Moreover, it would limit the meaning of the text in an equally
misconceived attempt to sever understanding and interpretation from
application. An author's or a period's understanding of a text or of
itself cannot be the only legitimate understanding for a different age
with different experiences. Rather, as Gadamer writes, "Every age has
to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs
to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which
it seeks to understand itself."9
At work here is what Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons." 10 On
the one hand, Austen's text provides an object of interpretation
common to Emma Thompson and to other interpreters. On the other
hand, Thompson's interpretation fuses with the text as the meaning
the text possesses. One might follow E.D. Hirsch, Jr., and claim that
the issue here is not the meaning of Austen's text but its significance.
Meaning, Hirsch insists, must be determinate and this determinacy can
be guaranteed only by equating meaning with an author's or agent's
intention. What can change historically is not meaning, then, but
8. See RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982).
9. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 296.
10. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 306.
11. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967).
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol9/iss2/4
Warnke
the importance or relevance of a text for us. But this distinction
misses the point. For the question Thompson seeks to answer is what
the book says, not what the significance of what it says may be for us.
In other words, if the book says anything at all it must say something
to us, but because we are historically situated, what it says to us in
our circumstances and given our attitudes, culture, and experience will
reflect a fusion of our historical horizon and that of the book as the
book's meaning for us.
Yet, it is not clear that only historical differences in interpretation
are legitimate. While each generation must understand a given text in
its own way, not all parts of a single generation need understand
those texts in the same way. If historical distance explains the possible
legitimacy of different understandings of the meaning of the same text
or common object, the same factors that explain the legitimacy of
these differences also explain the legitimacy of our non-historical
differences. We differ in the experiences we have had, the concerns
we possess, the motives and expectations we bring to a given work,
and in the cultural attitudes, individual sensibilities, and heritages that
provide our context for understanding. Thompson's understanding of
Sense and Sensibility is not the only understanding that can make
sense or speak to a modern consciousness. An alternative
interpretation might focus on Marianne's behavior and try to make
sense out of the circumstances under which the excesses of a first love
could almost kill a person. In pursuit of such an interpretation, Tony
Tanner refers to Foucault's account of the increase of nervous
diseases in the later part of the eighteenth century and stresses the
extent to which the illness Marianne contracts is psychosomatic. 2 In
doing so, he understands Austen to be criticizing the sort of society
where social form and masquerade dominate and where the sincere
expression of feeling gives rise to both physical and mental illness.
Indeed, we might argue that it is Marianne's very sincerity and
unwillingness to mask her feelings that attracts the man she eventually
marries and that this man has far more substance than Edward whose
appeal seems, in fact, limited to his ethical propriety."
An interpretation of Sense and Sensibility that focuses on Marianne
will thus be importantly different from and even opposed to one that
focuses on Elinor. While one teaches us to respect and even perhaps
12. See Tony Tanner, Introduction to JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 7, 15-22 (Tony
Tanner ed., Penguin Books 1978) (1811).
13. Thompson's film version adds a beginning sequence at Norland Park to give Edward
more depth, evidently because he is so slight a character in the novel, at least for contemporary
readers. But Marianne's eventual husband, Colonel Brandon, has both ethical propriety and a
depth of experience and sorrow that makes him more credible, at least to us, as someone
Marianne or Elinor might love.
1997]
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emulate an ethical propriety our culture has lost, the other asks us to
explore the relation between madness and the forms and constraints
of civilization. Nonetheless, the difference and even opposition
between the two interpretations renders neither illegitimate. Rather,
we look forward to different interpretations of the texts of our
tradition just because of the different light a new interpretation might
shed on them and because of the way attention to a different part of
the text allows us to rethink our understanding of both the text and
ourselves. Austen's novel has a different meaning if it is understood
as reminding us of the virtues of self-restraint than if it is understood
as reminding us of the social construction of reason and illness. One
might try to synthesize the two understandings and claim that Austen
sees virtues and vices in both ethical propriety and emotional
expression and thinks that each might be tempered by the other. But
it is equally important that precisely our interpretive differences foster
the discussion of the novel and lead to new syntheses in an ongoing
way that our discussion will never exhaust. Literary discussion does
not disclose the one true sense of a text but rather exhibits its
different aspects and the different perspectives under which it can be
validly understood, as a self-identical "common object" that "ac-
cording to the claim it makes . . .must be understood at every
moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way." 14
The specter that looms here is obviously that of relativism. I have
argued that different interpretations of meaning can be equally
illuminating and legitimate. Moreover, I have suggested that their
legitimacy is tied not only to differences in historical perspective but
to differences in cultural and even personal perspective. But if the
legitimacy of an interpretation does not preclude the legitimacy of
other interpretations dependent on different historical, cultural, or
subcultural perspectives, this lack of exclusiveness does not support
an indiscriminate inclusiveness. Rather, one can surely argue that
differences in interpretation are tied to different perspectives and
concerns without assuming that all sources of understanding are
equally legitimate or that all interpretations are equally good. Before
pursuing this point, I want to turn to a current controversy over a
constitutional issue to indicate how we can tolerate and even learn
from different interpretations of our principles even if we need not
tolerate and learn from all interpretations of them.
14. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 309.
400
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Clearly, part of constitutional adjudication involves applying
constitutional principles to a changed and changing world. If we are
to understand the meaning of the First Amendment's protection of
free speech, we must do so, at a minimum, in light of changed and
changing attitudes towards women and in light of increased concern
about violence against them. Similarly, if we are to understand the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection we must do
so in the light of our particular history, a history that includes
discrimination and segregation as well as an increasingly multi-ethnic
and multi-cultural society. The force of the "must" at stake here is an
epistemological rather than a moral one. Just as we cannot understand
Sense and Sensibility in the way either Jane Austen or her original
audience understood it, we cannot understand the Constitution
according to the "original intent" of its framers. In the first place, we
have to apply its principles to issues that could not have come up for
those framers: what equality means or requires in a country that has
had the history we have had; what respect for the sanctity of life
means given new birth technologies and ways of sustaining life; what
freedom of speech means with regard to women's equality; and so on.
In these cases, the principles embedded in the Constitution must be
applied to new issues.
One might claim that we should decide them in terms that the
framers could have accepted if they had been aware of them. But this
sort of speculation itself seems to involve interpretive decisions. We
must try to figure out what aspect of the new issues or situations
would have been important to the framers, how it would have been
important, and how they would have thought of it if they could have.
We must decide how the principles with which we are concerned are
relevant to the new situations in which we find ourselves, but this
means we must understand the principles themselves in terms of the
perspective the new situation sheds on them. Gadamer thus rejects a
division between understanding, interpretation, and application in
legal hermeneutics just as he does in textual hermeneutics. The tasks
of judge and legal historian are complementary: While the judge must
understand and interpret the law to apply it, the legal historian must
know how it is to be applied in order to interpret and understand
what it says.
But what if current interpretive differences over the meaning of
constitutional principles extend from differences between generations
of interpreters to differences among them? What if we can understand
the principles that we think are embedded in the Constitution in
1997]
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different legitimate ways just as members of the same generation can
understand Sense and Sensibility in different legitimate ways? Our
divisions over abortion are a case in point and I shall try to show how
in part by relying on two sociological studies, Abortion and the
Politics of Motherhood by Kristin Luker 5 and Contested Lives: The
Abortion Debate in an American Community by Faye D. Ginsburg.16
Both studies are important insofar as they indicate the different
interpretive horizons within which pro-life and pro-choice groups
approach the issue of abortion. I shall be trying to tie these horizons
to differing interpretations of the principles of liberty and respect for
the sanctity of individual human life.
The debate over abortion is often conceived of as what Laurence
Tribe calls a "clash of absolutes," as a controversy over moral and
legal principle that pits those adhering to a principle of sanctity of
human life against those who adhere to a conflicting principle of
liberty.17 Conceived of in this way, resolving the public controversy
depends upon determining which of these principles should have
either moral or legal priority. Thus, pro-life advocates are said to
insist that respect for the principle of the sanctity of human life with
regard to "unborn children" must precede a respect for the principle
of liberty with regard to women, because the right to life is the basis
upon which a right to liberty can exist at all. Conversely, pro-choice
advocates are said to argue that a woman's right to determine her
own destiny, including the question of when or if she is to be a
mother, is the only right at issue. But Luker's and Ginsburg's research
indicates that pro-life and pro-choice groups agree in the principles to
which they appeal: Both pro-choice and pro-life advocates invoke the
principle of liberty and the principle of respect for the dignity of
individual human life. Their differences are not differences over
principle. Instead, I shall suggest that they bear greater similarity to
our interpretive differences over the meaning of a work of literature.
For pro-life advocates all human life is to be respected as sacred,
as is the very act of intercourse through which new life begins. Sexual
intercourse is meant primarily for procreation and should therefore be
engaged in only when one is married and, moreover, open to the
possibility of becoming pregnant. Indeed, pro-life advocates are as
typically against artificial means of contraception as they are against
abortion for, in their view, such means undermine a reverence for the
act of sexual intercourse and reduce it from an act connected to the
15. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
16. FAYE D. GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE IN AN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (1989).
17. See LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
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potential creation of human life to an act that is merely healthy or
fun. Hence, pro-life advocates tend to view Natural Family Planning
(NFP), a method of unassisted birth control in which couples abstain
during fertile periods of the woman's cycle, quite differently from the
way in which pro-choice advocates typically view various methods of
birth control. According to Luker, what is important about NFP for
pro-life advocates is neither its effectiveness nor its reliability,
precisely the characteristics pro-choice couples stress in their
estimation of various birth control techniques."8 Rather, pro-life
advocates stress the sacred quality sexual intercourse has precisely
because without highly efficient means of contraception it always
involves the possibility of creating life. As one of the respondents in
Luker's study claims, "The frame of mind in which you know there
might be a conception in the midst of a sex act is quite different from
that in which you know there could not be a conception... I don't
think that people who are constantly using physical, chemical means
of contraception really ever experience the sex act in all of its
beauty."19
Consistent with this view of contraception is a view of parenthood
that rejects the idea that it must be planned for, prepared for, or fit
into one's overarching life plan. Rather, what pro-choice women call
"unwanted pregnancies" are for pro-life women "surprise pregnan-
cies" and there is always room in one's life for the child that results.
For some pro-life advocates, the capacity to accommodate unplanned
pregnancies issues from the contours of a woman's life, at least if she
is married and has children. From this vantage point, a woman's life
is one devoted primarily to raising children, managing a household,
and attending to the needs of her husband. To refuse to allow room
in this scenario for one more child is simply selfish and self-indulgent.
For other pro-life advocates, this priority of caring for others over
selfish concerns holds even when a woman's life is not yet arranged
so that an unanticipated pregnancy can be easily integrated into it.
For this group, a woman's unwillingness to change her life to
accommodate a baby or to struggle through less than optimal
circumstances for raising children serves as a sign of a growing
materialism and lack of generosity in American life.2 An interest in
money, career-prestige, and social advancement outweigh care and
concern for others. As Ginsburg puts the point, for pro-life groups
abortion often reflects "a social denial of nurturance. 21
18. LUKER, supra note 15, at 168.
19. Id. at 167-68.
20. GINSBURG, supra note 16, at 127-29.
21. Id. at 185.
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From a pro-choice perspective, the pro-life position on the sanctity
of human life and even human sexual intercourse is simply
"medieval"22 while its view of pregnancy and childbirth is irrespon-
sible. Sexual intercourse can be "amative" as well as procreative and
when it possesses a "transcendent" character, it does so, not because
of any potential connection to pregnancy and childbirth but because
of its actual connection to intimacy.' Moreover, one's responsibility
to children means that there is not always "room for one more" or
even for one. Parenthood is no longer part of a supposedly natural
scheme of things but is rather optional and therefore special, requiring
special preparations. Children need the best set of resources in terms
of emotional, psychological, social, and financial stability one can
provide for them and, hence, if one is responsible, one will become a
parent only when one is emotionally, psychologically, socially, and
financially ready to be one and to care for children in an appropriate
way.2 As one pro-choice minister responded to Luker, "I remember
giving a talk [in which I said] that I thought one of my roles was to
be an advocate for the fetus, and for the fetus' right not to be
born... I think if I had my druthers I'd probably advocate the need
for licensing pregnancies. '"25
Both pro-life and pro-choice advocates thus appeal to the values of
nurturance and care in appealing, jointly, to a principle of the sanctity
of human life. At the same time, they understand this principle in
very different ways: Whereas pro-life advocates link it to the idea of
appreciating and accommodating new human life in all its forms and
in all circumstances, pro-choice women stress the need to be responsi-
ble, careful, and considerate of both the human life that already exists
and that could potentially exist.
The same holds for pro-life and pro-choice appeals to a principle of
liberty. In the view of the pro-life advocates that Luker studied,
women are free to choose different sorts of lives but these lives bring
different commitments with them. Thus, while women can freely
choose to pursue careers and should be paid as well as men if they do
so, they should also recognize that the choice of marriage and sexual
activity bring with them the serious responsibilities of caring for
children, husbands, and homes and that this care and concern for
others comprises a full-time job on its own. In this regard private and
public spheres are equal and complementary. By denying this
complementary relation, pro-life groups think that pro-choice views
22. LUKER, supra note 15, at 178.
23. See id. at 176-78.
24. Id. at 181.
25. Id. at 182.
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leave a desert where the province of care and concern for others
ought to be.26
Pro-choice advocates, in contrast, conceive of a principle of liberty
in terms of women's opportunities. For pro-choice advocates, men and
women can occupy the same worlds; both can work and ought to be
involved in raising their children. Moreover, they think that women
who do not work are inviting disaster, that they are only "one man
away" from a life of poverty in which they cannot care for their
children at all, much less devote their lives to accomplishing this
task.27 For pro-choice women, caring for one's family is only one of
the roles women can perform and, given the ability to control their
reproductive lives, it need not limit their options any more than it
limits those of men.
Thus, again if pro-life and pro-choice advocates commonly refer to
a principle of liberty, they understand this liberty in different ways:
pro-life groups as the liberty to choose a life with all the respon-
sibilities that potentially arise out of it; pro-choice groups as the on-
going ability to determine the contours of one's life and the respon-
sibilities one will accept. Hence, as in the case of the common appeal
of pro-life and pro-choice groups to the principle of respect for the
intrinsic value of human life, their common appeal to a principle of
liberty overlays a perspectival difference in terms of which, as Luker
points out, our differences over abortion are only "the tip of the
iceberg., 28 People differ on the legal question of whether abortion
should be accessible because they inhabit different interpretive
communities: They differ in their life circumstances and resources, in
the choices they have made, in their orientation toward life, their
attitudes toward parenthood, and their understanding of the meaning
of sexual intercourse itself. Not only do they differ; they are also
mutually suspicious. From a pro-choice point of view, the pro-life
position is not only medieval but ideologically designed to maintain
traditional gender roles and to eliminate women from public life.
From the pro-life point of view, the pro-choice perspective is equally
frightening in its ability to undermine a way of life that pro-life
advocates find not only satisfying and meaningful but the last defense
against the crass materialism of modern life. For Luker, both
factors-the entirely different cultures in which pro-life and pro-
choice advocates live and the threats to their way of life that each
position finds in the other-make it clear "why the abortion debate
26. I have extrapolated here from the findings Luker reports. See id. at 159-63.
27. See id. at 176.
28. Id. at 158.
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is so heated and why the chances for rational discussion, reasoned
arguments, and mutual accommodation are so slim."29
But are they so slim? Pro-life and pro-choice advocates refer to
what in Gadamer's terms would be self-identical common objects and
even principles referring in the end to natural law: to a respect for the
sanctity of individual human life and to a principle of liberty. In the
case of literary texts, the conjunction of a common object and
different perspectives revealing different aspects of it leads to fruitful
discussion. In Emma Thompson's interpretation of Sense and
Sensibility, we learn the limits of our self-absorption, while in Tony
Tanner's interpretation we learn the limits of social form. But we are
led by the difference between the two interpretations to attempt a
synthesis or accommodation that signals a more moderated response
to both our self-absorption and our dependence on social forms.
Moreover, this accommodation serves as a basis for further
interpretive discussion. But why should we not conceive of our
differences over abortion in the same way, not as applications of
incompatible principles, but as different, equally legitimate
interpretations of common principles. Why not conceive of them as
the basis for fruitful discussion, moderation, and mutual accom-
modation together with an openness to further interpretive pos-
sibilities?
Were we to conceive of our debate over abortion in this way, it
might become clear to each side what it might learn from the other.
By taking seriously the pro-choice understanding of a respect for the
sanctity of life, the pro-life view might learn to find dimensions in the
meaning of this principle that center on the particularity of different
family and therefore life circumstances. Most obviously, it might learn
to consider the level of social services required if women and children
are to have what the pro-life position might understand as a decent
life. As many pro-life groups already acknowledge, one cannot be
consistently pro-life only up to the point of birth. Rather, a pro-life
position might learn to concern itself with pre-natal care, child-care,
and the poverty in which many families, with their children, live. On
the other side, however, the pro-choice position has a similar
opportunity to learn once it understands that its claims about the
sanctity of life reflect an interpretation of principle for which other
interpretations are available as well. By taking seriously a pro-life
view of the meaning of a respect for human life, pro-choice groups
might learn to acknowledge, as many, again, already do, that the
recourse to abortion remains a serious undertaking, one which raises
29. Id. at 191.
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questions about one's life and one's relations to others that cannot be
answered simply by claiming a woman's right to control her own
body.
Similar potential for mutual learning lies in our differing understan-
dings of the principle of liberty. From a pro-life point of view,
pregnancies happen and one's life adjusts to loving and caring for the
children that result. A pro-choice point of view need not accept all
the fatalism this life-orientation implies or the idea that the province
of loving and caring for children belongs only to women. Still, there
is a dimension of this view that seems important: Namely, that
technology is not always tied to human freedom and that particularly
new reproductive technologies bring with them a focus on control and
life-management that can blind us to other possibilities. This blindness
seems obvious with regard to new birth technologies, which can lead
couples to be so intent on technologically conquering their infertility
that they overlook the parenting opportunities that exist through
adoption." It seems to me that some of the same might be said for
attempts to control the effects of our fertility. We do not have to give
up all attempts to control fertility or infertility to see the point that
not all aspects of love or life are ones for which we can completely
plan. Instead, we might hold onto two ideas: First, the idea that
nurturance is a value that may require us to change our lives while
enriching them in the process and, second, the idea that recourse to
technological control can imprison our lives as much as it may seem
to liberate them.
Of course, if those who are pro-choice can learn to modify their
equation of liberty with control from the attitude pro-life advocates
take towards the meaning of liberty, pro-life advocates might learn
from a pro-choice understanding to see the raising of children as a
grave responsibility for both men and women. They might learn to
understand it not as simply a natural consequence for women of
certain actions they take, but as a journey the implications of which
redound upon both men and women and are awesome enough to
legitimate the idea that certain medical, emotional, psychological,
social, and financial circumstances preclude the possibility of
preparing adequately for it. Here parenthood is no longer conceived
of as an inevitable part of life but as an opportunity while liberty
means the freedom of families to decide for themselves when and if
they cannot pursue it.
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Thus, we might overcome a "clash of absolutes" in the debate over
abortion by recognizing the different positions as alternative,
legitimate interpretations of the meaning of norms and principles that
both sides in the debate take seriously. The point of such debate is
not to prove the exclusive legitimacy of one set of arguments but to
come to appreciate, to learn from, and even to accommodate different
ways of understanding common objects: in this case, principles of life
and liberty. In the end, pro-life and pro-choice advocates might agree
to a moderate position. They might mutually acknowledge the danger
in linking individual liberty so closely to individual control over all
life's consequences that we ignore the possibilities for changing and
enriching our lives that lie in certain events that happen to us.
Moreover, both pro-life and pro-choice advocates might acknowledge
the way in which aspects of modern life threaten values of nurturance.
At the same time, they might agree that if we are to rethink our
equation of individual liberty and technological control, the conse-
quence of doing so cannot effect women alone but must move the
society as a whole to establish the institutional conditions necessary
for protecting values of nurturance. Further, pro-life and pro-choice
advocates might agree to remove childbirth and child care from the
domain of simply natural occurrences and acknowledge circumstances
under which neither children nor families can flourish. The result of
such a reciprocal learning process might well be a synthesis of
interpretations in which, as a society, we actively encourage values of
nurturance and promote the opportunities for enriching one's life that
a pregnancy can offer while agreeing that families themselves must
finally decide the conditions under which they cannot pursue such
opportunities. Moreover, we might agree to foster and fund the kind
of social and cultural institutions that would minimize the circumstan-
ces in which such a decision would have to be made. Hence, we might
agree to support pre-natal care, paid parental leaves, decent and
affordable child care, and flexible work schedules, on the one hand
and teen-age abstinence, sex education, and easy access to reliable
birth control, on the other.
There is an obvious danger, however, with this sort of synthetic
solution. For surely not all interpretations of our principles are ones
we should try to appreciate or to accommodate. The interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment expressed in Plessy v. Ferguson,3 1 for
example, would seem to be simply racist. Are we to take seriously
sexist or racist interpretations of our moral and constitutional
principles, and if not, what are the criteria to distinguish legitimate
31. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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interpretations, from which we ought to try to learn, from illegitimate
interpretations, which we ought simply to dismiss? Even if we concede
that more than one understanding of principles we share may be
valid, surely there are some understandings that remain invalid.
Following F.D.E. Schleiermacher,32 Gadamer links the legitimacy
of interpretations of meaning to the hermeneutic circle. An adequate
understanding of a text works piecemeal by fitting new parts or
dimensions of it into a coherent whole one during the process of
constructing. An interpreter understands the meaning of the first
chapter of a book in a certain way and then tries to find an
interpretation for the second chapter that will cohere with the
meaning he or she found in the first. If the interpreter cannot find
such an interpretation, he or she has to revise the original understan-
ding of the first chapter to find an interpretation that fits both it and
the subsequent chapters. Understanding is, thus, a circular movement
in which the understanding of the meaning of new chapters of the
book proceeds on the basis of the understanding the interpreter has
constructed of the meaning and unity of the previous chapters, while
at the same time, his or her understanding of the new chapter may
require revising the understanding of those previous parts. For
Schleiermacher, the endpoint of this process is the "harmony of all
the details with the whole," a harmony which is also, for him, "the
criterion of correct understanding., 33
Gadamer suggests that this criterion works, at least, to expose the
probable illegitimacy of certain understandings of meaning. An
interpretation of a text is at least presumptively illegitimate if it does
not admit of a unity between part and whole. One must presuppose
that a given text composes a unified whole since only its unity can
supply a standard for checking one's interpretations of its various
parts and either rejecting those that do not fit with the whole or
revising one's conception of the whole. A given interpretation need
not integrate every aspect of a text to be legitimate. Nevertheless, it
must integrate enough of what it can show to be the text's important
aspects to count as an interpretation of the unity of that particular
text. For some texts, ultimately no interpretation may prove capable
of revealing a coherent whole. Still, as Gadamer puts the point, "when
we read a text we always assume its completeness, and only when this
assumption proves mistaken-i.e., the text is not intelligible-do we
begin to suspect the text and try to discover how it can be
remedied." 34
32. See F.D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTIK UND KRrrlK (Manfred Frank ed., 1977).
33. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 291.
34. Id. at 294.
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Plessy v. Ferguson seems to fail as an adequate interpretation of the
principle of equality or the Fourteenth Amendment on this criterion;
that is, it fails to provide an interpretation that gives a unity of
meaning to the principle as it is embodied in our Constitution.
Instead, it allows one group not only to be separated from another
group but to be separated from all access to the benefits and
opportunities of the society at large. On this interpretation, the
principle of equality would therefore have to encompass the inequality
of opportunity and participation. The same might be said for current
critiques of affirmative action policies that interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment in terms solely of a principle of racial neutrality in order
to insure an equality of opportunity based only on merit and
qualification. This one-sided interpretation again fails to account for
that aspect of the principle of equality that includes the full par-
ticipation of all in the benefits and opportunities of society. Affir-
mative action policies cannot be rejected, therefore, simply on the
basis that they violate a principle of equality for, at the very least, that
principle includes both the racial neutrality on which opponents of
affirmative action focus and the participation of all races in our social
and political life.
Still, if Plessy and the critique of affirmative action both fail to
make a coherent whole out of our principle of equality and fail as
legitimate interpretations on this ground, it is not clear that all holistic
interpretations of our principles or texts or text-analogues are equally
valid. An interpretation of a woman's attempt to reject a man's sexual
advance may fit into an interpretive whole in which women typically
mean yes when they say no and resist sexual advances only to raise
the pitch of sexual excitement. Here we may fit all the details of the
woman's speech and action into a coherent whole yet fail to grasp her
meaning at least as he understands it. Hence, if discrepancies between
part and whole constitute a reason to reject a given interpretation of
a text, it is not clear that a lack of discrepancy legitimates understan-
ding. Gadamer himself introduces a second dimension of his "a-
nticipation of completeness": "The prejudice of completeness . ..
implies not only this formal element-that a text should completely
express its meaning-but also that what it says should be the complete
truth."35 Put otherwise, Gadamer's point is that we must assume not
only that a text composes a unity of meaning but that what it claims
or expresses might be illuminating. The rationale for this condition is,
again, one that involves the possibility of testing the legitimacy of our
interpretations. If the text is not meant to say something to us, to
35. Id. at 294.
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reveal a "truth" or tell us something we did not already know, then
it is not clear how we can check the validity of our own understanding
of either it or the issues or topics it addresses. We must, Gadamer
thinks, treat the text as a partner in dialogue who raises questions
about our views and assumptions, questions we could not raise on our
own but which remain ones we must answer if we are to retain or
develop our own understanding.
Gadamer's basis for the second part of his anticipation or prejudice
of completeness is thus the same as for the first: If we are to be able
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate interpretations of a
text, we require non-arbitrary criteria for doing so. Such non-arbitrary
criteria are supplied by the text itself insofar as we assume that it
constitutes a unity of meaning that is worthy of our decoding efforts.
Hence, we assume that it comprises a meaningful whole so that we
can discard any interpretations that do not show how it comprises a
meaningful whole, where by whole we mean a unity of meaning and
by meaningful, we mean meaningful to us. For Gadamer, then, it is
incumbent upon interpreters to try to understand a text in such a way
that it not only composes a unity of meaning but has something to
teach us. Textual understanding becomes a test of our prior opinions.
We put them at risk or into play in trying to understand and as long
as we remain open to the possibility of "being pulled up short by the
text,, 36 our attempts to understand can also raise questions about
what we previously thought we knew.
To this extent, the problem with a sexist interpretation of a
woman's rejection of a sexual advance is that while it might com-
petently unify part and whole, it can affirm only our pre-held
assumption about what women mean. Similarly, an interpretation of
Sense and Sensibility that dismisses the book as a novel about
outmoded marriage stratagems affirms only our pre-held belief about
the progress we have made in providing women with ambitions other
than a good marriage. Thompson, however, shows us what we might
still learn from an ethical propriety of thought and behavior and the
same sort of openness to alternative interpretations seems basic to
understanding what someone is saying or thinks she is saying in a
sexually heated situation. Insofar as what we can learn about
ourselves is inexhaustible, there will be more than one legitimate
interpretation of Austen's novel. Similarly, there may be more than
one legitimate interpretation of what a particular woman means when
she says no. The legitimacy of those that are legitimate, however, will
depend in part upon their capacity to unify part and whole and, in
36. Id. at 268.
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part, upon an openness to the potential illumination that the texts or
text-analogues they are trying to understand can shed on our previous
assumptions about both them and ourselves. A sexist interpretation
of a woman's sexual advance might pass the first test. It does not pass
the second.
What relevance does this analysis have to the case of abortion?
Neither the pro-life nor the pro-choice view seems to render
principles of liberty or the sanctity of human life incoherent. Rather,
each illuminates aspects of them from which the other side can learn.
While the pro-life understanding of life and liberty illuminates
important aspects of our reliance on and assumptions about a
technologically based mastery of our lives while re-emphasizing the
value of nurturance, the pro-choice understanding illuminates
questionable assumptions about the difference between men and
women and, furthermore, points to social conditions of care and
concern for others. But if pro-choice and pro-life groups illuminate
different important dimensions of principles of life and liberty, then
the policies in terms of which we apply these principles ought to try
to accommodate what each side can learn from the other. We ought
to aim for forms of consensus and compromise that will try to
synthesize legitimate interpretations. And where we cannot, we ought
to concentrate on institutional procedures that will at least allow
different legitimate voices to be heard.
This sort of hermeneutic or interpretive debate reflects what Jirgen
Habermas, following Nancy Fraser,37 calls the weak public sphere,
a sphere that he defines as "an open and inclusive network of
overlapping, subcultural publics having fluid temporal, social, and
substantive boundaries., 38 The point of such publics for Habermas
consists of discovering and identifying problems or issues and in
becoming sensitive to different and new ways of looking at them. But
he insists that they are vulnerable "to the repressive and exclusionary
effects of unequally distributed social power, structural violence, and
systematically distorted communication."39 For this reason, he argues
that in complex societies weak publics must be anchored in stronger,
procedurally regulated public spheres that ideally filter out these
effects by institutionalizing guarantees of equal access and so on. On
this view, the sort of openness to being educated on which a
Gadamerian approach rests is simply too weak.
37. See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109, 134 (Craig Calhoun
ed., 1992).
38. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 307 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
39. Id. at 307-08.
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There are, however, two dangers here. The first and perhaps more
important is the one on which Habermas focuses: What we take as
legitimate interpretations from which we ought at least to try to learn
are distorted by unequal relations of power, money, or ideology.
Current attacks on affirmative action might fall into this rubric, as an
ideological attempt to preserve certain power relations masquerading
as a plausible interpretation of equality or equal opportunity. But the
view of equal opportunity at the base of criticism of affirmative action
also fails on purely hermeneutic grounds. Because it is one-sided, it
fails both as a holistic interpretation on its own and as an
interpretation that can take the measure of an alternative
interpretation of our principles and our history, one that focuses on
a record of past discrimination, the struggles of different groups for
political and civil rights, and the relation of equality and participation.
Moreover, it does so because it assumes that a principle of equal
opportunity has a fixed meaning that can be understood in only one
way.
This failure points to the second danger: What we take as positions
distorted by the effects of power, money, or ideology comprise
interpretations from which we might have learned. As Americans we
share certain common objects, including principles that we also think
are embedded in our Constitution. Our debates, then, might more
properly be viewed as debates over meaning rather than debates over
principle in which one and only one side can be right. We are
historically finite and for this reason no interpretation of our
principles can be the last word on meaning. But we are also culturally,
experientially, and cognitively finite. For this reason, no understanding
can exhaust the possible meanings of our common objects even for us.
This admission does not entail that all interpretations of our principles
are equally legitimate. Nevertheless, to dismiss the learning potential
provided by the legitimate interpretations of others in a dogmatic
attachment to what we take to be principle is, I think, to confuse an
understanding of law and principle with the fires that burn the same
in Persia as in Greece.
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